Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4677
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA JAPAN

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 TAGS: PFOR, KS, JA, US

SUBJECT: HOW TO MANAGE US TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA: SOME JAPANESE VIEWS

SUMMARY: OFFICIAL JAPANESE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE IDEA OF US TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA HAS BEEN GENERALLY NEGATIVE, RANGING FROM ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO, MORE RECENTLY, RECOGNITION THAT JAPAN MUST PREPARE FOR THE INEVITABLE. PRIVATELY, MEMBERS OF FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT IN TOKYO HAVE BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE AND POSITIVE, CONCENTRATING ON HOW WITHDRAWAL MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT UPSETTING POWER BALANCE ON PENINSULA, AND WITHOUT AROUSING DOMESTIC POLITICAL PASSIONS. CONSENSUS OF INFORMAL VIEWS IS THAT US TROOP WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE (A) BASED ON STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS RATHER THAN AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES AND EXPLAINED AS SUCH; (B) SUPPORTED BY CONFIDENTIAL

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COMPENSATING MEASURES THAT WOULD MAINTAIN MILITARY/POLITICAL BALANCE OF POWER ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA; (C) ACCOMPANIED BY DIPLOMATIC MOVES TO EASE TENSIONS IN THE AREA; (D) GRADUALLY AND SELECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED; AND (E) DISCUSSED WITH THE GOJ IN A MANNER THAT WOULD LIMIT JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DAMAGE. COMPLEXITIES ARE SUCH THAT FIRST STEP IN MANAGING PROBLEM MIGHT BE

"CONSULTATIONS ON CONSULTATIONS" -- A PRELIMINARY ROUND DESIGNED TO DETERMINE FORM AND FORMAT MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO BOTH. END SUMMARY.

INTERNAL PUBLIC ALARMS

1. OFFICIAL JAPANESE PUBLIC CONCERN OVER IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPANESE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EAST ASIA OF AN AMERICAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA SURFACED JUST AFTER US ELECTION. NOVEMBER 10 SPEECH IN MINNEAPOLIS BY WASHINGTON AMBASSADOR TOGO URGING NO CHANGE IN US TROOP PRESENCE IN THE ROK RECEIVED UNPRECEDENTED PRESS ATTENTION IN JAPAN, OVERSHADOWING EVEN THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF EMPEROR HIROHITO'S REGIN. DURING THE NEXT SIX WEEKS LEADING OFFICIALS CONCERNED, INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER KOSAKA, JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA) VICE MINISTER MARUYAMA, SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL KUBO, AND JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO SEOUL NISHIYAMA ALL ISSUED PUBLIC STATEMENTS ECHOING TOGO VIEW. MOST NEGATIVE AND ADAMANT OF THESE CAME FROM MARUYAMA, WHO TOLD PRESS IN EARLY DECEMBER THAT US WITHDRAWAL "WOULD INVALIDATE THE BASIC PREMISES FOR THE FORMULATION OF OUR STANDARD DEFENSE-FORCE CONCEPT. THE PRESENCE OF US MILITARY FORCES, ESPECIALLY GROUND FORCES," MARUYAMA WENT ON TO SAY, "IS AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR MAINTAINING STABILITY IN THAT PENINSULA, WHICH IN TURN MAKES IT AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR JAPAN'S OWN STABILITY. "IN MY VIEW," MARUYAMA CONCLUDED, CONFIDENTIAL.

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"SIMPLY TALKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A WITHDRAWAL CAN HAVE A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT DETRIMENTAL TO THE STABILITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY." PRESS ANALYSIS ACCOMPANYING THESE REMARKS WAS SIMILARLY ALARMIST, WITH TONE SET BY AN ASAHI SHIMBUN EDITORIAL DESCRIBING JAPAN'S DIPLOMACY AS "VIOLENTLY SHAKEN BY TALK OF WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM KOREA."

THE MOOD CHANGES

2. PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 21 MARKED SHIFT IN THE OFFICIAL JAPANESE PUBLIC STANCE ON THE ISSUE, AWAY FROM THE INFLEXIBLE OPPOSITION EXPRESSED EARLIER. HIS REITERATION OF CAMPAIGN PLEDGE TO REMOVE TROOPS FROM KOREA APPARENTLY CONVINCED JAPANESE THAT SOME SORT OF DECISION WAS UNAVOIDABLE. AT SAME TIME PRESIDENT-ELECT'S EMPHASIS ON GRADUAL IMPLEMENTATION AND CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH

JAPAN AND ROK WAS COMFORTING. REACTING TO THE STATEMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE STRESSED THAT JAPAN HAD NO MEANS OF RESISTING A US WITHDRAWAL AND HOPED THAT ACTION WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY DIPLOMATIC MOVES TO EASE TENSION. BY END OF YEAR PRESS WAS REPORTING JUDGMENT WITHIN JDA THAT US GROUND TROOPS IN THE ROK WOULD PROBABLY BEGIN A GRADUAL PULLOUT WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR THAT WOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE EARLY 1980S AT LATEST. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO.

SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY

3. PRIVATE AND INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ESTABLISHMENT IN TOKYO HAVE REVEALED A FAR MORE COMPLEX AND FLEXIBLE VIEW ON THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. THEY CONINUE, OF COURSE, TO SEE CONFIDENTIAL

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MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO ON KOREAN PENINSULA AS VITAL TO JAPANESE SECURITY AND REMAIN ANXIOUS ABOUT ANY CHANGES THAT MIGHT THREATEN BALANCE OF POWER THERE.

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THEY UNDERSTAND THAT IMPORTANCE OF US GROUND FORCES IN ROK PRIMARILY POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL.

ACCORDINGLY, RATHER THAN DISMISS IDEA OF TROOP
WITHDRAWALS AS UNTHINKABLE OR BEMOAN ITS INEVITABILITY,
THEY HAVE FOCUSSED ON BEST MEANS OF EFFECTING
WITHDRAWALS WITHOUT UPSETTING BALANCE ON PENINSULA,
AND WITHOUT AROUSING INTENSE LOCAL PASSIONS THAT HAVE
LONG COMPLICATED DOMESTIC PTLITICAL HANDLING OF KOREAN
ISSUES.

4. CONSENSUS SO FAR IS THAT WITHDRAWALS MOST MANAGEABLE FOR JAPAN UNDER FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

A. ACTION SHOULD BE GENUINELY BASED ON STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND CAREFULLY EXPLAINED AS SUCH. ONE OF THE MAIN FEARS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ESTABLISHMENT IS THAT US DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM KOREA WILL BE BASED, OR BE INTERPRETED AS HAVING CONFIDENTIAL

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BEEN BASED, ON DOMESTIC PRESSURES CREATED BY
ROK-CAPITOL HILL SCANDAL, HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AND
PUBLIC DISTASTE FOR PARK DICTATORSHIP RATHER THAN ON
CLEARLY EXPLAINED AND DEFENSIBLE TACTICAL/STRATEGIC
GROUNDS. GOJ WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING US
DECISION FOR PHASED TROOP WITHDRAWAL IF MADE AFTER CAREFUL
ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIAN POWER
BALANCE, AND CAREFULLY EXPLAINED AS SUCH, BOTH IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE.

JAPANESE OBSERVERS HAVE NOT SAID BUT HAVE
IMPLIED, THAT EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL
PRESSURES OVERRIDING ASIAN STRATEGIC CONCERNS WOULD
CALL INTO QUESTION AMERICAN SOUNDNESS AND RELIABILITY
AS AN ALLY. THIS CONCERN, AS WELL AS GENERAL JAPANESE
DEFENSIVENESS ON THE ENTIRE TOPIC OF AMERICAN TROOP
WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA, IS FED BY UNDERLYING FEAR
THAT US-ROK RELATIONS DETERIORATING, AND FURTHER
THREATENED TO UNKNOWN EXTENT BY REVELATIONS THAT
MIGHT BE MADE IN "KOREAGATE" SCANDAL. BEYOND THAT
IS WORRY THAT JAPAN MAY SOMEHOW BE CAUGHT IN BETWEEN
US AND ROK AND FORCED TO PLAY UNWANTED POLITICAL OR
SECURITY ROLE.

B. WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE GRADUAL AND IMPLY NO LESSENING OF US COMMITMENT. IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY DECISION TO WITHDRAW GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE

CAREFULLY PHASED OVER FOUR-TO-FIVE YEARS, TO LESSEN IMPACT ON STRATEGIC BALANCE AND AVOID IMPRESSION THAT US PRECIPITATELY ABANDONING COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN REGION. JAPANESE WILL EXAMINE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN US DECISION TO REDUCE US TROOP PRESENCE IN ROK, AND WILL BE ANXIOUS TO SEE EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL BACKING FOR GRADUAL APPROACH TO WITHDRAWAL WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF CONTINUED FIRM US COMMITMENT TO SECURITY OF ROK.

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C. WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE SELECTIVE AND BALANCED BY COMPENSATORY MEASURES. JAPANESE COMMENTATORS AND DEFENSE EXPERTS ASSUME THAT FORCE REDUCTION WILL BE LIMITED TO GROUND TROOPS AND PERHAPS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, LEAVING TACTICAL AIR CAPABILITY, COMMAND AND LOGISTICAL STRUCTURE, AND US NAVAL POWER IN AREA UNDIMINISHED. THEY BELIEVE THAT ANY AMERICAN GROUND FORCE REDUCTION SHOULD BE COUNTERBALANCED BY INCREASED US SUPPORT FOR MODERNIZING ROK CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO TACTICAL MISSILES AND TANKS.

D. WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY LOWERING OF TENSION ON KOREAN PENINSULA.

JAPANESE TAKE AS GIVEN THAT REDUCTION OF AMERICAN FORCES IN ROK WILL NOT PROCEED IF TENSIONS RISE ON PENINSULA. THEY WOULD PREFER TO SEE REDUCTION ACCOMPANIED BY DIPLOMATIC MOVES INVOLVING SOVIET AND CHINESE PARTICIPATION THAT WOULD UNDERWRITE STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

E. WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH JAPAN BUT IN A WAY THAT WILL LIMIT DOMESTIC POLITICAL DAMAGE. GOJ OFFICIALS WANT A CHANCE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS FULLY BEFORE US MAKES UP ITS MIND. THEY WANT TO BE INFORMED WELL IN ADVANCE WHAT US PLANS TO DO ONCE FINAL DECISION TAKEN, BUT DO NOT REPT NOT WANT TO BE CONSULTED IN WAY THAT SUGGESTS JAPAN PARTY TO DECISION. ALTHOUGH KNOWLEDGE OF CONSULTATION WOULD HAVE TO BE PUBLIC, JAPANESE DO NOT WANT DETAILED SUBSTANCE OF ANY EXCHANGE TO BE OPEN. JAPANESE OFFICIALS POINT OUT THAT CONSULTATION WHICH CAST THEM IN CODETERMINANT ROLE ON ANY AMERICAN DECISION TO WITHDRAW GROUND FORCES FROM THE ROK WOULD FACE THEM WITH TWO SERIOUS PROBLEMS. FIRST. THEY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEVELOP CLEAR POLICIES ON TEHCNICAL MILITARY QUESTIONS THEY HAVE AVOIDED BEFORE. SECOND, AND MORE WORRISOME, THEY WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFRONTED WITH THE PROBLEM OF DEFENDING SUCH POLICIES IN THE DIET, WHERE THEY WOULD CONFRONT HOSTILE REACTION FROM BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT.

5. IN SUM, JAPANESE LOOKING FOR CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WHICH PROVIDES (A) OPPORTUNITY AND TIME TO ASSIMILATE US THINKING LEADING TO DECISION (B) ABILITY TO SHOW THAT USG HAS SOLICITED GOJ VIEWS AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT JAPANESE INTERESTS AND (C) ADVANCE INFORMATION OF USG DECISIONS. FACED WITH THESE NEEDS AND DANGERS, JAPANESE WHO EXPRESS VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT SUGGEST THAT THE FIRST STEP IN MANAGING WITH JAPAN A REDUCTION OF US FORCES IN KOREA MIGHT BE "CONSULTATIONS ON CONSULTATIONS" -- A PRELIMINARY ROUND DESIGNED TO DETERMINE THE FORM AND FORMAT OF DISCUSSIONS MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO BOTH SIDES. HODGSON

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